Developing production of a non-traditional crop in Southeast Asia: wheat in Thailand

Abstract

Urbanization has led to increased wheat imports by nontraditional, wheat producing countries. Globally, Southeast Asia has had the most rapid increase in wheat consumption. Over the past decade, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos, and Vietnam have attempted to assess the feasibility of initiating domestic wheat production to substitute or supplement their imports of wheat. All of these countries have areas suitable for wheat production, but no production experience, indigenous consumption, or marketing structures for wheat to provide a base for expansion. Despite the appeal of developing domestic wheat production, it must be considered essentially an experimental venture. Thus while it has been possible to gain the enthusiasm of technical people, it may not necessarily rate high on the list of government priorities. The main difficulties of developing wheat in Thailand have surprisingly not been technical issues, such as poor plant development, pests, and diseases. Instead, the unfamiliarity of the crop amongst scientists, extension workers, and farmers has been the key constraint. Functionally this has resulted in a number of problems in unexpected areas; Identifying the areas where wheat would have a comparative advantage over other crops was not clear for some time. As a result, early extension efforts were scattered and shifted from area to area. The recommended technology for planting wheat was too intensive and liable to misinterpretation by farmers, which led to repeated crop failures in the early years of the program. Easily adopted technologies that allowed reliable crop establishment by farmers took some time to evolve. Local grain merchants had no knowledge of wheat and were not prepared to purchase small volumes from isolated groups of farmers. This created a lack of confidence in the crop among farmers and extension workers. These issues were recognized as being significant once the production program was in the progress and they had to be dealt with as they were encountered. The program in Thailand is notable in that it has not been structured as a pilot project with a specific pilot area for production; special fund allocations; or any program to buy back the crop from farmers. Instead, the program has been implemented within existing planning, budgeting, and operating procedures of the various government institutions involved. This has had inherent difficulties, but has also led to some innovative initiatives. In the long run, these have given the program greater strength and sustainability: The difficulty of marketing small quantities of the crop was initially addressed by attempting to promote local use of the crop. The Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE) has begun to develop a market structure for wheat based on local independent grain merchants. This should expand dynamically with a minimal input of government funds. A wide range of institutions has been involved in the program, which gave the program access to inspiration and initiatives from different directions. This has helped maintain momentum to a greater degree than if only one institution were involved. Finally, the problem of developing appropriate production technologies for a diverse production environment, was solved through a process of cross-fertilization between researchers' on-farm trials, and farmers' informal trials. This interaction between research and extension evolved through a "participatory extension" approach that engaged farmers in the process of fine-tuning the technologies to their particular situation. Most of the major crops that have been introduced to Thailand since World War II (i.e., maize, cassava, soybean, and tobacco) have been export-driven, with the private sector playing an active role in supplying farmers with inputs, production technologies, and a waiting market. Wheat, on the other hand, is competing with efficiently produced imports, with all stages of the program for developing production; technology development, seed supply, and marketing, being led by the government sector. This offers a unique opportunity to draw useful lessons. At this point, the technical viability of wheat production has been established. Dynamic expansion of the crop has yet to occur and will depend on the program's successful transition from being government-sponsored to the private sector. Final establishment of the crop will also depend on factors outside of the program's control, such as world prices for wheat. This Report focuses on the processes and dynamics of wheat's introduction and its expansion, the underlying constraints and imperatives, and the roles and interactions of the various cooperating institutions. The three chapters covering these topics are briefly summarized below.